Plaintiffs' constitutional rights violated by administrative policy allowing probation officer to approve non-appealable, non-final, ex-parte orders without judicial oversight

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. This Court has made clear that the RookerFeldman Doctrine is simply an application of 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Does the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine bar a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 damages claim that claims that the administrative policy of allowing a probation officer approve non-appealable, non-final, ex-parte orders in the name of a judge without any judicial oversight violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights? 2. In the instant case, the “State Defendants” did not raise the issue of immunity under Martin v. Children’s Aid Society, 215 Mich. App. 88 (1996) for over five years after they were served with the complaint and not until after they had filed two ; previous Rule 12 Motions, lost an appeal, and filed two answers to the complaint. Are all potentially dispositive affirmative defenses to be treated as a failure to state a claim for the purposes of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g)(2) and (h)(1)? 3. With the circuit courts split, is qualified immunity to be granted to a defendant that creates their own exception to the Fourth Amendment until the relevant Circuit Court finally finds that no exception exists? . 4. In the instant case Plaintiff alleged that the ex-parte order to remove children was facially deficient for a number of reasons, including that the order used a “reasonable grounds” standard instead of the “probable cause” standard contained in the Fourth : Amendment. Is the relevant order facially deficient under the Fourth Amendment standards? ii .