Whether the Constitution limits venue in criminal trials to those places where the defendant could reasonably foresee that an overt act would occur

QUESTIONS PRESENTED The right to be tried in the vicinage of where a crime occurred was fundamental to English common law. When King George III suspended that right for certain crimes committed in the American colonies, the Founders charged him with unjustly transporting colonists “beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offences.” The Declaration of Independence para. 21 (U.S. 1776). The Founders deemed this right essential to individual liberty. Article III, Section 2, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he Trial of all Crimes * * * shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed.” That right, however, was not alone sufficient. The Founders also secured in the Sixth Amendment the right to trial “by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law.” The courts of appeals have divided as to the meaning of the vicinage protections. The Second Circuit holds that criminal venue is limited to those places that are reasonably foreseeable to a defendant. Below, the Third Circuit, joining the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, rejected a reasonable foreseeability test. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the Constitution limits venue in criminal trials to those places where the defendant could reasonably foresee that an overt act would occur. 2. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) limits venue in criminal trials regarding continuing offenses to those places where the defendant could reasonably foresee that an overt act would occur.