Whether a shipper's notice asserting a rail carrier's liability for damage to specifically identified cargo and demanding a determinable amount of money is rendered insufficient to trigger binding UBL limitations periods because the notice does not purport to rely on Carmack

QUESTION PRESENTED The Carmack Amendment (“Carmack”) provides the exclusive remedy for shippers to hold rail carriers liable for damage to cargo. Under the federally required uniform bill of lading (“UBL”), a shipper must file a written claim with the carrier within nine months. If the carrier denies that claim, the shipper then has two years and one day to file suit. This Court long ago directed courts to apply this requirement in a practical way, focusing on whether a notice sufficiently apprises the carrier of the character of the claim. Ga., Fla. & Ala. Ry. Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U.S. 190 (1916). Regulations thus require that a claim simply identify the damaged cargo, assert the carrier’s liability, and demand “determinable” damages. There is an acknowledged circuit split as to whether this regulation governs contested claims, but all ten circuits that have ruled on the issue assess a shipper’s notice under either the regulation or Blish’s practical inquiry. Contrary to Blish, the regulation, and the decisions of those ten circuits, the Eighth Circuit held below that a factually sufficient notice and denial did not trigger the limitations periods merely because the notice cited Canadian law and stated that the shipper “will submit” a Carmack claim at a later date. The question presented is whether a shipper’s notice asserting a rail carrier’s liability for damage to specifically identified cargo and demanding a determinable amount of money is rendered insufficient to trigger binding UBL limitations periods because the notice does not purport to rely on Carmack. (D