Charles G. Kinney v. Frances Rothschild, et al.
SocialSecurity DueProcess FirstAmendment Securities
Whether 11 U.S.C. Sec. 524(a)(1) and 11 U.S.C. Sec. 524(a)(2) void court judgments that determine a discharged Chapter 7 no asset' debtor still has personal liability to a listed unsecured creditor
QUESTION PRESENTED It is rare for a federal statute to say it “voids” a court judgment, but that is exactly what 11 U.S.C. Sec. 524(a)(1) does. If that decision determines a 2010 Chapter 7 “no asset” discharged-debtor still has some “personal liability” to a listed-unsecured creditor, that judgment, order or sanction is void regardless of the rationale used to justify it. Since the statute “voids” the decision, there is no need for a collateral attack; it is not a defacto appeal; and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply. 11 U.S.C. Sec. 524(a)(2) prohibits listed unsecured : creditors from employing any means to obtain any judgment, order or sanction which determines (e.g. presumes) a discharged Chapter 7 “no asset” debtor still has “personal liability” to a creditor. For over 8 years, listed unsecured-creditor David : Marcus has filed attorney fee motions on behalf of -his client, discharged Chapter 7 “no asset” debtor Clark, based on pre-petition contracts, with help from contract attorney Eric Chomsky. Their goal ‘ was to shift preand post-petition attorney’s fees incurred by Clark onto listed-creditors Kinney and Kempton, co-buyers of Clark’s house in 2005. Dockets show that state and federal courts keep issuing decisions that concede debtor Clark is still liable to creditor Marcus for legal work (and Marcus keeps filing attorney’s fee “cost” motions to shift those fees onto Kinney), contrary to law. Bosse requires all courts to follow the law. Why is this court ignoring Kinney’s constitutional rights? i id