Whether the Portal-to-Portal Act modified the FLSA's broad, pre-1947 definition of 'work'

QUESTIONS PRESENTED The last time this case was here, the Court unanimously held that time spent by employees in post-shift security screenings is not compensable worktime under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”). That was because of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, which amended the FLSA to overturn case law that interpreted the FLSA’s definition of “work” too “broadly.” Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc. v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513, 516517 (2014) (Busk I). After remand, a divided Sixth Circuit panel nonetheless held that the exact same security screenings are compensable under the FLSA’s current definition of “work.” The court rightly concluded, as a threshold matter, that respondents’ state-law claims depend on that definition because it is incorporated without alteration into state law. But the court then misinterpreted the FLSA’s definition of “work” in two ways. First, the court held—in conflict with Busk I and several circuit courts—that the Portal-to-Portal Act did not actually change the pre-1947 definition of “work.” Second, it held—again in conflict with several circuit courts—that “work” does not require physical or mental exertion. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the Portal-to-Portal Act modified the FLSA’s broad, pre-1947 definition of “work.” 2. Whether the FLSA’s definition of “work” requires exertion beyond the minimal effort involved in passing through a security screening.