Whether religious organizations' names like The Universal Church' and 'Universal Church' can be deemed generic as a matter of law regardless of evidence that the relevant public does not primarily understand them as generic

QUESTION PRESENTED Religious organizations frequently confront claims that their names are generic and ineligible for trademark protection. Courts are divided over such claims. The Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits apply the same test to religious organizations that applies to other marks: How does the relevant contemporary public understand the name? By contrast, the Second Circuit (in the decision below) and the New Jersey Supreme Court apply a religion-specific test. They determine the significance of religious organizations’ names based on technical theological usages and archaic religious texts, regardless of whether those sources reflect contemporary perceptions. As a result, the Second Circuit held as a matter of law that “The Universal Church” and “Universal Church” are generic based on the same type of evidence that the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have rejected. The Question Presented is: Did the Second Circuit err by holding that marks of religious organizations, like “The Universal Church” and “Universal Church,” may be generic as a matter of law regardless of evidence that the relevant public does not primarily understand them as generic?