Whether the exception to procedural default established in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), and Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2018), is categorically inapplicable in Illinois

QUESTION PRESENTED In Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), and Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013), this Court held that ineffective assistance by a prisoner’s state postconviction counsel may excuse the procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel if a state explicitly or effectively requires the prisoner to bring that claim on post-conviction review rather than on direct appeal. The “chief concern” of this doctrine is “to ensure that meritorious claims of ... ineffective assistance of trial counsel”—which “often turn[] on evidence outside the trial record,” Martinez, 566 U.S. at 12—“receive review by at least one state or federal court.” Davila v. Davis, 137 8. Ct. 2058, 2067 (2017). Illinois effectively directs claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that turn on evidence outside the trial record to post-conviction review. Yet here, the Seventh Circuit held that the MartinezTrevino exception to procedural default is categorically inapplicable in Illinois. In doing so, the Seventh Circuit not only departed from this Court’s precedent, but broke with the reasoning of decisions from four other courts of appeals that have concluded that the Martinez-Trevino exception applies in four other states. The net effect is that claims that turn on extra-record evidence are guaranteed to escape judicial review in Illinois—precisely what Martinez and Trevino seek to prevent. The question presented is: Whether the exception to procedural default established in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), and Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2018), is categorically inapplicable in Illinois.