Mario Villena, et al. v. Andrei Iancu, Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office
Is the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (Title 5 U.S.C. § 706) somehow nonrelevant under Alice/Mayo, or does the Federal Circuit's refusal to address unlawful abuses by the USPTO when reviewing claim rejections under Alice/Mayo an abuse of discretion?
Is it remotely plausible under any noncapricious administration of the Alice/Mayo test that five separate claim limitations can be completely unknown and nonobvious under Titles 35 U.S.C. §§ 102/103, yet at the same time be well-understood, routine, and conventional individually and as an ordered combination under an Alice/Mayo § 101 analysis?
Does a requirement of "invention" and "improvement" under the Alice/Mayo framework violate the statutory language of Title 35 U.S.C. § 101, legislative intent, and the Supreme Court's repeated edict of Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208 (2014), Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010), Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), and Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), that preemption, not invention or improvement, is the sole criteria for determining exceptions to patent eligibility?
Rejection of patent claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101 without addressing each limitation separately and as an ordered combination, lack of substantial evidence, and prejudice to petitioners