Does the definition of 'religious institution' in the ministerial exception require a faith-based institution with a hierarchy of ministers?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Does the definition of “religious institution” in the two prong test for “ministerial exception” in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. : . v. £.£.0.C., 565 U.S. 171, 132 §.Ct. 694, 709, 181 L.Ed. 2d 650 (2012) (hereinafter “Hosanna”) require that the “religious institution” be “faith-based” and have at its head to hire and fire either a certified, ordained or lay “minister” and/or a hierarchy of such ministers, ; ; or is it sufficient for the “religious institution” to be an institution administered in hiring and firing by . totally lay people with. absolutely no ministerial . . certification, formal or informal, and with no hierarchy whatsoever of ministers, as in Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day School, Inc., 882 F.3d 655 (2018) (hereinafter “Grussgott”, which the Seventh Circuit has held , in this case? 2. Does the “ministerial exception” require a) religious “experience” as opposed to religious “training”, as held by the Seventh Circuit in Grussgott and , contrasted in Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Washington, Inc., 363 F.3d 299 (2004); b) religious ; teaching and job descriptions that are “tasked” : Hosanna-Tabor at 132 S.Ct. 694, 708, as opposed to “volunteered”; and c) teaching with a cultural, historical : : perspective, which was held to be ministerial under . the “ministerial exception” as the Seventh Circuit : held in this case Grussgott, as opposed to “faithbased” teaching, leading and supervising, under the Sixth Circuit in Alyee T. Conlon v. Intervarsity Christian Fellowship/USA, 777 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2015) , ii and the Fourth Circuit under Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew . Home of Greater Washington, Inc., 363 F.3d 299 (2004). 3. Is the MJDS policy of non-discrimination on of its staff a waiver of any right to claim the ministerial : ' exception? Grussgott at 657-658. This case presents . an opportunity for the Supreme Court of the United States to rule on the “waiver” argument which was elucidated by the Sixth Circuit Court in Alyee T Conlon v. Intervarsity Christian Fellowship/USA, 777 F.3d 829, 836-838 (6th Cir. 2015), citing to Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. ; 2007), decided after Hosanna-Tabor. It appears the Conlon court reads the Supreme court to not allow the waiver because “such action interferes with the internal governance of the church” citing Hossana at 705. In the present case, of course, the non-discrimination clauses cannot be construed under “church internal governances” because none of the governing supervisors of the secular like school resemble church : hierarchies since they are clearly not ministers who govern the school. Even under the Sixth Circuit court above, it appears that there is still the questions of whether the First Amendment claims can be asserted as a defense against state claims. . : iii ;