Should the regulation issued by CMS, 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d)(2)(ii), be stricken as contrary to the statutory language, which provides that the obligations in (a) and (b) be read as applying to only one class of persons?

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd CEMTALA"), imposes two distinct requirements on hospitals based upon two classes of persons. Hospitals must (a) "sereen" any individual who "comes to the emergency department" to determine if the person has an “emergency medical condition” and also (b) "stabilize" or “transfer” an individual who “comes to a hospital” and is determined to have an “emergency medical condition." In 2008, attempting to resolve a cireuit split, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") issued a clarifying regulation, which renders the statutory language creating the second class of persons, i.e, person who “come to a hospital” as superfluous. Under this interpretation, which runs afoul of the otherwise clear statutory language, the obligation to (b) stabilize does not apply to an individual who has been admitted to the hospital. Instead, it only applies to one who “comes to the emergency department.” The Third Circuit has afforded this regulation deference pursuant to Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand has ruled CMS's regulation invalid, holding that the stabilization requirement extends to those admitted to a hospital for inpatient care. 1. Should the regulation issued by CMS, 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d)(2)(ii), be stricken as contrary to the statutory language, which provides that the obligations in (a) and (b) be read as applying to only one class of persons? 2. When it upheld the regulation, did the Third Circuit—and the District Courts that have followed its interpretation—give undue and reflexive Chevron ia deference to the agency interpretation of an unambiguous statute? 3. Should this Court reconsider Chevron?