No. 18-1359

William Shannon Gresham v. Tennessee

Lower Court: Tennessee
Docketed: 2019-04-29
Status: Denied
Type: Paid
Response Waived
Tags: acquitted-conduct criminal-procedure double-jeopardy due-process jury-trial sentencing sentencing-enhancement sixth-amendment sufficiency-of-evidence
Key Terms:
Environmental SocialSecurity Securities Immigration
Latest Conference: 2019-06-13
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Whether a trial court may use acquitted conduct by a jury that rejected the State's proof on a particular issue in order to enhance a defendant's sentence on a separate or lesser-included offense?

Question Presented (OCR Extract)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to a trial by an impartial jury to have his or her guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court reaffirmed the principle in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013) that any facts that increase either the mandatory minimum or maximum sentence must be submitted to ajury. In spite of this well recognized principle, courts across the country use acquitted conduct to enhance a sentence for a separate or lesser included offense thereby negating the jury’s verdict of not guilty which specifically rejected the theory of the State and the evidence associated with that theory. Thus, the questions presented here are: (1) Whether a trial court may use acquitted conduct by a jury that rejected the State’s proof on a particular issue in order to enhance a defendant’s sentence on a separate or lesser-included offense? (2) Whether a trial court may use that same acquitted conduct by a jury to support a conviction for a separate or lesser included offense? i

Docket Entries

2019-06-17
Petition DENIED.
2019-05-28
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 6/13/2019.
2019-05-17
Waiver of right of respondent State of Tennessee to respond filed.
2019-03-05
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due May 29, 2019)

Attorneys

State of Tennessee
Sophia Soo LeeTennessee Attorney General, Respondent
William Gresham
Mark Christopher ScruggsJohnson, Scruggs & Barfield, Petitioner