Whether a motion to intervene is timely when it is filed shortly after a would-be intervenor learns that the existing parties misrepresented that the would-be intervenor's rights would not be affected

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In United Airlines v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385, 394 (1977), this court held that an intervention motion under FRCP Rule 24 (a) was timely after it became clear to the would-be intervenor that her claims as an unnamed class representative would not be protected by the named plaintiffs. That decision has been followed by all of the courts of appeals, but The Seventh Circuit decided to change the test for when the time should run by using the word might which creates a more stringent standard for persons who have been deceived in believing that their interests would not be impaired or affected in the context of consent decree litigation. This test has not been followed by other circuit courts of appeals. In contradiction with well established law of the circuits, the Court did not credit petitioner’s claims that the state deceived it into believing that its interest would be protected and that there was no need to intervene. The questions presented are: Whether a motion to intervene is timely when it is filed shortly after a would-be intervenor learns that the existing parties misrepresented that the wouldbe intervenor’s rights would not be affected. Whether an unrebutted statement of facts submitted in support of a motion to intervene must be accepted as true and considered by the district court. Whether the prejudice test under FRCP Rule 24 (a) begins to run when the would-be intervenor clearly knows its interests will be affected after learning of a deception used to discourage intervention. Whether a consent decree may affect statutory rights that are not specifically protected by a provision of the consent decree.