Whether the Respondent's counsel failed to comply with the District Court Scheduling Order, thereby violating the petitioner's procedural due process rights

QUESTIONS PRESENTED The following questions arise from employment discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e § et seq. ("Title VII"), concerning several errors of law that compounded and _ perpetuated throughout the pleadings and eventually impacting the trial that culminated to “procedural due process violation” of the petitioner’s 5th Amendment. Aside from the Respondant’s three counsels and magistrate judge, two other district judges whose legal findings and decisions were vital in the petitioner’s case, contributed to the petitioner case. A senior district judge, who had reviewed the magistrate judge’s findings and legal contentions, wrote an “Opinion” on March 10, 2017 and a corrected legal findings and legal contentions of the magistrate judge. ; Additionally, the senior judge wrote a detailed “AMENDED RULE 16(b) SCHEDULING ORDER” on April 10, 2017. The other district judge was a trial judge who appointed to preside over the trial just a ; month before the trial date on August 1, 2017. Trial started about two years and six months after the petitioner’s complaint was filed in the district court. Whether the Respondent’s counsel that failed to comply with the District Court Scheduling Order necessarily violate procedural due process rights of the petitioner such that the petitioner is barred from ii” ; presenting substantive admissible direct material evidences and calling witnesses to show not only that the Respondent is dissembling in the pretext stage of trial, but also the proposing official to remove the petitioner from Federal Service was acting in concert with two others in a calculated scheme of the invidious discrimination having legal elements of conspiracy under 42 U.S. § 1985(8). Whether the magistrate judge that effectively vacated the reviewing District Court judge’s Scheduling Order, by denying the petitioner’s imposition of sanctions pursuant to petitioner motion in accords to Rule 16(f) and Rule necessarily violates the petitioner’s procedural due process to the detriment of the petitioner case. Whether the Magistrate judge that denies the effectuation of the District Court Scheduling Order, necessarily engages in abuse of discretion that leads : in violation of the petitioner’s procedural due process rights causing the petitioner not to be able to introduce admissible probative material evidence that also include sham affidavit during trial that directly contradicts the employer’s legitimate assertions and shifting narratives in justifying employee termination. Whether the District Court’s trial judge that denies the petitioner motion for the effectuation and implementation of the District Court Scheduling iii Order in accords with the aforementioned Opinion of the senior District Judge for introducing evidence contrary to the Respondent’s claims and defenses, necessarily prevents and prejudices the petitioner of a fair hearing during petitioner’s evidentiary presentation in trial before jury, thus violating the petitioner procedural due process. Whether the trail judge that reduces the trial days from the requested 5 days, which was previously approved verbally by District Court, to 2 days, necessarily interfered with petitioner’s procedural due process by indirectly pressuring the petitioner to rush through lots of scientific technical nuances embedded in the evidentiary proof. : Whether the trial judge that dismisses the petitioner’s internationally recognized expert witness from testify, necessarily substituted his own technical competency of technical issues with that of technical expert witness and, thus, adversely interfered with the petitioner’s procedural due process in the presentation of material facts in his case before jury. Whether the trial judge that grants Respondent’s Rule 50(a) motion as matter law that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient basis to find for the petitioner in his title VII discrimination and retaliati