Michael B. v. Tennessee Department of Children's Services
DueProcess
Whether the lower court's denial of the Father's motion to disqualify the Guardian Ad Litem, when her actions clearly indicated she had ceased being an attorney, and had become a witness, was in error and violated the Father's parental rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
QUESTION PRESENTED The United States Supreme Court has traditionally upheld the principle that parents have the fundamental right to direct the upbringing of their children. The Supreme Court has unwaveringly given parental rights the highest respect and protection possible. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Supreme Court emphasized “the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right of the individual... to establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to his own conscience” /d. at 403. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the Supreme Court reaffirmed Meyer and asserted the parent’s fundamental right to keep their children free from government standardization. Jd. at 535. In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), the Supreme Court made it clear that parent’s rights as outlined in Pierce and Meyer are fundamental and specially protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court in Santosky quoted Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 37 (1981), wherein, the Supreme Court opined it was “not disputed that state intervention to terminate the relationship between a parent and a child must be accomplished by procedures meeting the requisite of the Due Process Clause.” QUESTION PRESENTED Whether the lower court’s denial of the Father’s motion to disqualify the Guardian Ad Litem, when her actions clearly indicated she had ceased being an attorney, and had become a witness, was in error and violated the Father’s parental rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.