Whether a state court is objectively unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) in concluding a capital defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to introduce 'double-edged' evidence of fetal alcohol syndrome that may indicate future dangerousness

QUESTION PRESENTED During the sentencing phase of this capital case, respondent’s experienced defense team argued that respondent suffered from a one-time emotional deterioration of mental state that resulted in the murder of a former girlfriend. Aided by several experts, they introduced evidence of respondent’s major depressive episode and obsessive compulsive disorder, along with evidence of his chaotic background, broken home, limited intelligence, and prison adaptability. They chose not to introduce evidence they possessed that respondent had brain damage. On post-conviction review, the state court concluded that counsel was not ineffective for not additionally pursuing potential fetal alcohol syndrome mitigation evidence. It found that neither prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), was met. A federal district court granted habeas corpus relief, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. On the issue of prejudice, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that evidence of brain damage “can be a double-edged sword, given that it may also indicate future dangerousness to the jury.” For that reason, the court further acknowledged that respondent’s counsel may not wish to introduce evidence of fetal alcohol syndrome in future proceedings. Yet the Fourth Circuit nonetheless held that respondent was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to introduce fetal alcohol syndrome evidence, and the state court was objectively unreasonable in not reaching that conclusion. The question presented is: Is a state court objectively unreasonable, for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), when it concludes ii that a capital defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to introduce evidence that a federal habeas court concludes is a “double-edged sword” that might “indicate future dangerousness” and which counsel may well choose not to introduce in any further proceedings.