Whether a district court has discretion to deny an injunction when it is the only statutory remedy after plaintiffs prove an imminent and substantial endangerment under RCRA

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Petitioners are private attorneys general who brought a Congressionally authorized Citizen Suit against Respondent under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) at 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). The remedy in a RCRA Citizen Suit is an injunction — in this case, an order mandating a cleanup. On Summary Judgment, the District Court found Respondent’s contamination posed an imminent and substantial endangerment to health and the environment within the meaning of RCRA but denied an injunction requiring Respondent to abate the danger, finding that Petitioners had not proved irreparable harm. The Court of Appeals disagreed and found irreparable harm and an endangerment, but nevertheless affirmed the District Court’s decision to deny relief, finding an injunction was not necessary. According to the Court of Appeals, the State of Illinois and Respondent were parties to a state court Consent Order, which both courts concluded provided adequate relief. At issue is the proper role of federalism associated with a federal statute requiring a district court to mandate abatement of contamination found to be a public danger, and a district court’s abstention from ordering relief based on a responsible party having reached a separate agreement with a state environmental agency pursuant to a state statute that Congress did not recognize as preclusive. The questions presented are: 1. Does a district court have equitable discretion to deny an injunction when an injunction is the only form of statutory relief, after plaintiffs proved the merits of ii the case, and where the equitable factors for injunctive relief require a mandatory injunction? 2. Where Congress has determined that enforcement of state environmental law is not preclusive in 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) cases, can a district court rely on a Consent Order in an irrelevant state court action brought by a state government under an irrelevant state law as a basis for denying an injunction? 3. Can a federal court abstain from entering an injunction because a state environmental agency was seeking relief under a state statute that Congress did not find to be an adequate basis for precluding federal jurisdiction? 4. When Congress provided district courts with the authority for RCRA endangerments to order “such other action as may be necessary,” after a finding of an imminent and substantial endangerment and irreparable harm, was Congress directing district courts to order the action that was necessary, or were district courts given the discretion to find that no action was necessary?