Responses to fundamentally ambiguous questions or literally truthful answers to unambiguous questions can constitute false declarations before a federal grand jury under 18 U.S.C. § 1623

QUESTION PRESENTED In Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973), this Court declared that “the perjury statute is not to be loosely construed, nor the statute invoked simply because a wily witness succeeds in derailing the questioner — so long as the witness speaks the literal truth. The burden is on the questioner .” The Court further emphasized that “[p]recise questioning is imperative as a predicate for the offense of perjury.” In this light: Can responses to fundamentally ambiguous questions — or literally truthful answers to unambiguous questions — constitute “false declarations” before a federal grand jury under 18 U.S.C. § 1623, on the basis that (a) forbidden imprecision in questioning is limited to “glaring instances of vagueness or doublespeak ... that ... would mislead or confuse a witness”; or that (b) the grand jury witnesses should have understood from the “thrust” of the line of questions that the prosecutors meant something other than what they actually asked? i LIST OF ALL PARTIES The caption of the case in this Court contains the names of all parties (petitioners and respondent United States). Co-defendants Henry Alfano and William Hird are filing a separate petition, which is related to the instant petition as explained under Point 2. There were other co-defendants at trial; those individuals either were acquitted or have not joined in the petitioners’ appeal. ii