No. 18-1585

Kassim M. Nagi v. Louisiana

Lower Court: Louisiana
Docketed: 2019-06-27
Status: GVR
Type: Paid
Response RequestedResponse WaivedRelisted (3)
Tags: 8th-amendment controlled-substances cruel-and-unusual-punishment cruel-unusual-punishment eighth-amendment first-time-offender lockyer-v-andrade money-laundering proportionality proportionality-test racketeering sentencing solem-v-helm
Key Terms:
DueProcess Punishment
Latest Conference: 2020-04-24 (distributed 3 times)
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Whether a 90-year consecutive sentence for a 33-year-old first-time offender violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment

Question Presented (OCR Extract)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1. A sentence, even within range, is excessive when it imposes punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the evidence, or constitutes nothing more than the needless infliction of pain and suffering. So, do the 8th Amendment and the proportionality test required by Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983), bar as punitive a 90-year consecutive sentence — 30-year sentences each for racketeering and money laundering, and 15 years each for distribution of, and possession of, synthetic marijuana — as excessive and cruel and unusual punishment for a 33-yearold, first-time offender such that the term-of-year sentences, for constitutional purposes, constitute the same as a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole? See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003). 2. In order to prove a defendant guilty of racketeering, the state must prove the existence of an “enterprise” as a separate element from “pattern of racketeering activity.” Therefore, does one commit racketeering when the state implicitly alleges by its indictment and fails to present evidence that the defendant knowingly participated in a prohibited pattern of racketeering activity, without proving the enterprise, separate elements required by United States v. Turkette, 452 US. 576, 583, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 252829, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981)? li QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW — Continued 3. “Proceeds,” as used in money laundering statutes, means profits rather than gross receipts. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 128 S.Ct. 2020, 170 L.Ed.2d 912 (2008). Therefore, does a state fail to prove money laundering and create a “merger problem” when it seizes cash and credit card receipts from a convenience store business but fails to differentiate between the proceeds for milk and gasoline and synthetic marijuana?

Docket Entries

2020-05-29
MANDATE ISSUED.
2020-05-29
JUDGMENT ISSUED.
2020-04-27
Petition GRANTED. Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED for further consideration in light of <i>Ramos</i> v. <i>Louisiana</i>, 590 U. S. ___ (2020). Justice Alito, concurring in the decision to grant, vacate, and remand: In this and in all other cases in which the Court grants, vacates, and remands in light of <i>Ramos</i> v. <i>Louisiana</i>, I concur in the judgment on the understanding that the Court is not deciding or expressing a view on whether the question was properly raised below but is instead leaving that question to be decided on remand. Justice Thomas would deny the petition for a writ of certiorari.
2020-04-20
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 4/24/2020.
2019-11-26
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 12/13/2019.
2019-11-21
Reply of petitioner Kassim Nagi filed.
2019-11-12
Brief of respondent Louisiana in opposition filed. (11/20/2019)
2019-08-23
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is extended to and including November 12, 2019.
2019-08-15
Motion to extend the time to file a response from September 13, 2019 to November 12, 2019, submitted to The Clerk.
2019-08-14
Response Requested. (Due September 13, 2019)
2019-07-31
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 10/1/2019.
2019-07-29
Waiver of right of respondent Louisiana to respond filed.
2019-06-24
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due July 29, 2019)

Attorneys

Kassim Nagi
Mark David Plaisance — Petitioner
Mark David Plaisance — Petitioner
Louisiana
Elizabeth Baker MurrillOffice of the Attorney General, Respondent
Elizabeth Baker MurrillOffice of the Attorney General, Respondent