Whether a federal court can exercise jurisdiction to compel arbitration based solely on the existence of an arbitration agreement, without a finding of a failure, neglect or refusal to arbitrate and without conducting the statutory trial under 9 U.S.C. § 4, when the party opposing the motion to compel arbitration has made a request for trial and has made an unequivocal denial of any failure, neglect or refusal to arbitrate

QUESTION PRESENTED _ | In its brief opinion, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the court “has no jurisdiction to decide future claims before the Equal Employment | : Opportunity Commission” and further stated “and Plaintiff has agreed to arbitrate her claims” The appeals court seems to rely on the mere existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate as the rationale for affirming the lower court’s order granting USAA’s motion to compel arbitration and dismissing with prejudice Clack’s Title VII claims including those claims arising from the same nucleus of operative facts, but still pending administrative exhaustion with the EEOC. The appeals court turned a blind eye, as the lower court did, to Clack’s raised disputed issues of material fact, her unambiguous assertion of no failure, neglect or refusal to arbitrate and her repeated requests to proceed summarily to a trial pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 4. In affirming the lower court’s exercise of jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit completely ignored, as the lower court did, the statutory requirement of a trial under 9 U.S.C. § 4 as a prerequisite to the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction to compel. And the Fifth Circuit declined to address whether USAA even had standing to bring its motion to compel given USAA’s failure to show it had suffered any harm and failure to show that Clack’s activity amounted to a failure, neglect or refusal to arbitrate her Title VII claims that were still pending administrative exhaustion. 1 This case thus raises important jurisdictional issues critical in maintaining the nation’s confidence in the disposition of matters before federal courts where the parties have a valid arbitration agreement. Thus, the specific question presented is: Whether a federal court can exercise jurisdiction to compel arbitration based solely on the existence of an arbitration agreement, without a finding of a failure, neglect or refusal to arbitrate and without conducting the statutory trial under 9 U.S.C. § 4, when the party opposing the motion to compel arbitration has made a request for trial and has made an unequivocal denial of any failure, neglect or refusal to arbitrate. wu PARTIES TO PROCEEDING Petitioner Angela D. Clack was the plaintiff in the district court and the appellant in the court of appeals. Respondent United Services Automobile Association., was the defendant in the district court and the appellee in the court of appeals.