When determining the citizenship of a class for purposes of CAFA's home-state exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B), does this Court's long-standing residency-domicile presumption allow a court to presume that a class defined as state residents consists of at least two-thirds state citizens, or must a plaintiff come forward with additional evidence of citizenship?

QUESTION PRESENTED The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (““CAFA”) grants federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction over certain minimally diverse class actions, but requires district courts to decline jurisdiction in certain cases if, among other things, at least two-thirds of the class members are citizens of the state in which the action was originally filed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). The Sixth Circuit has held that, where the class is limited to state residents, this Court’s long-standing presumption that a person’s residence is his domicile allows the court to presume that the class consists of at least twothirds citizens, and puts the burden on the defendant to rebut that presumption. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have allowed the use of this presumption but required the plaintiff to offer at least some record evidence of class members’ residency to prove their citizenship. The court below, joining the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, held that such a presumption is never permissible. The question presented is: When determining the citizenship of a class for purposes of CAFA’s home-state exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B), does this Court’s long-standing residency-domicile presumption allow a court to presume that a class defined as state residents consists of at least two-thirds state citizens, or must a plaintiff come forward with additional evidence of citizenship?