Does the retroactive application of the Sex Offender Directives to Mr. Nunn violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution?

QUESTION PRESENTED Mr. Nunn committed sex crimes in 1997 and 1998. He pleaded guilty to those crimes in January 1999. His sentence at that time included imposition of community supervision for life (“CSL”) pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 39-13-524 and 526. Although CSL had been in existence for four years, the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole had not imposed any sex-offender specific supervision conditions in 1997 or 1998. Later, in 1999, following Mr. Nunn’s convictions, the Board adopted the “Sex Offender Directives,” also known as the “Specialized Parole Conditions for Sex Offenders,” which created from whole cloth a heightened and differentiated regime of rules, restrictions, penalties, and fees for sex offenders like Mr. Nunn, as opposed to any other person under supervision on parole. The Sex Offender Directives significantly modified and expanded the restrictions placed upon Mr. Nunn from those that were in place when he committed his crimes and when he was convicted, including placing him under curfew at the discretion of the Board. The question presented is: Does the retroactive application of the Sex Offender Directives to Mr. Nunn violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution?