South Carolina v. Lamont Antonio Samuel
DueProcess JusticiabilityDoctri
Did the South Carolina Supreme Court err when it held — in conflict with many federal courts of appeals — that a trial court may not deny a criminal defendant's motion to represent himself based on the 'defendant's improper motive or unethical conduct'
QUESTION PRESENTED In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834-35 (1975), the Court held that Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975), cautioned that the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation is “not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” In a 3-2 decision, a majority of the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the trial judge erroneously vetted Samuel’s sworn representations that an attorney not present at trial was involved in his case by having the attorney testify before her, even though the attorney’s denial of any involvement in the case supported the trial judge’s factual findings because it concluded that “a defendant’s improper motive or unethical conduct is not enough to preclude him from exercising his right to App. 16-17. This conflicts with seven circuit courts of appeals that hold self-representation may be denied based on pretrial conduct evincing manipulative intent. Given these facts, the Question Presented is Did the South Carolina Supreme Court err when it held — in conflict with many federal courts of appeals — that a trial court may not deny a criminal defendant’s motion to represent himself based on the “defendant’s improper motive or unethical conduct.” 1