Whether housing rental businesses are part of the federally protected domain of interstate commerce

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Questions here primarily evolve from what this Court determined in 1942: Back then—and what became a foundation for legal guidance—it was determined that the U.S. Congress, under the Commerce Clause, could regulate even a small-time farmer’s harvest of wheat for his personal use because such circumstances were legally assigned to be considered in the aggregate sense. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Under this legal wisdom—like farming considered in the aggregate— a single housing rental unit structure, considered in the aggregate of all housing rental units, would also come to fall within the federally protected domain of interstate commerce. As such, a street thug, like many before and after him under similar circumstances, was convicted and incarcerated in a federal prison for effectively interfering with interstate commerce by having used a Molotov cocktail to set a single housing rental structure on fire. United States v. Gomez, 87 F.3d 1093 (9t Cir. 1996); see also, e.g., Russell v. United States, 471 US. 858 (1985); United States v. McMasters, 90 F.3d 1394, 1398 (8 Cir. 1996) (upholding federal conviction for single rental unit arson). The Fifth Circuit, as with other circuits, has relied on criminal cases like Russell to instil]—in civil cases—that a housing rental transaction “unquestionably is an ‘activity that affects commerce,” and, thus, is a transaction that falls within the said federal domain to be subject to the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S. Code §3601, et seq.), among other acts of Congress, because of the ii Commerce Clause. Groome Resources, Ltd. v. Parish of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192, 207 (5th Cir. 2000). Against this backdrop, Petitioners’ attorney filed a complaint, seeking relief from an alleged effort by municipal Respondents to interfere with and restrain Petitioners’ commerce of engaging in housing rental transactions with their tenants. Denied relief and, what is more, having an extreme sanction imposed upon them for the complaint, Petitioners submit this: This case presents itself as what seems to be the Ninth Circuit’s now swimming against the legal current of interstate commerce these questions: 1. Whether housing rental businesses are a part of the federally protected domain of interstate commerce. 2. If such business are per se a part of the federal : domain, whether municipal actors, like Respondents—merely because they are local actors—are totally free from federal law to engage in the conduct of restraining housing rental competition by pursuing a self-designated unilateral municipal action that, by design, causes the losses of housing rental transactions of some of such businesses, like Petitioners’, in order to have tenants from there move/funneled to other such businesses that are favored, thus enabling the latter businesses, through no action of their own but that of the municipal actors, to have a competitive advantage over the former businesses. | 3. Whether a court’s replacement of the content of a moving party’s motion for an extreme : sanction obligates the court to first provide the alleged offending party, who is subject to the extreme sanction, notice and opportunity to address such content replacement as part of due process before the actual issuance of the extreme sanction. i iv