No. 18-285

Missouri v. Phillip Douglass, et al.

Lower Court: Missouri
Docketed: 2018-09-05
Status: Denied
Type: Paid
Response RequestedRelisted (2) Experienced Counsel
Tags: 4th-amendment civil-rights due-process exclusionary-rule fourth-amendment particularity particularity-requirement probable-cause search-and-seizure search-warrant standing warrant warrant-severability
Key Terms:
SocialSecurity FourthAmendment CriminalProcedure Privacy JusticiabilityDoctri
Latest Conference: 2019-03-15 (distributed 2 times)
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Is severance the default remedy when part of a warrant is valid, or does the Fourth Amendment also require that the valid sections make up 'the greater part of the warrant'?

Question Presented (OCR Extract)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Because the exclusionary rule should be “our last resort, not our first impulse,” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006), all the Courts of Appeals have held that the valid parts of a warrant may be severed from the invalid parts of a warrant. Many courts favor severance as the default remedy. Some courts, however, impose an additional condition before severance can apply: that the valid portion “make up the greater part of the warrant.” United States v. Sells, 463 F.3d 1148, 1150 (10th Cir. 2006). This split leads to very different outcomes. Here, the search of respondents’ home was conducted pursuant to a partially defective warrant, and a divided Missouri court upheld the suppression of all the seized evidence after finding that the valid parts did not make up the “greater part” of the warrant. In conducting its analysis, the lower court also committed two additional errors. It extended the “particularity” requirement to the warrant’s showing of probable cause. And it did not consider whether the exclusionary rule applied when the police officer checked a box on the warrant form based on a legal mistake, and the issuing judge signed off on it. I. Is severance the default remedy when part of a warrant is valid, or does the Fourth Amendment also require that the valid sections make up “the greater part of the warrant”? II. Does the particularity clause apply only to “the place to be search” and “the things to be seized,” or does it extend to the “probable cause” requirement? III. Does the exclusionary rule apply when the issuing judge signs off on the officer’s legal mistake in filling out a warrant form?

Docket Entries

2019-03-18
Petition DENIED.
2019-03-18
Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed by respondents GRANTED.
2019-02-27
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 3/15/2019.
2019-02-22
Reply of petitioner Missouri filed.
2019-02-11
Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed by respondents Phillip Douglass & Jennifer M. Gaulter.
2019-02-11
Brief of respondents Phillip Douglass & Jennifer M. Gaulter in opposition filed.
2019-01-18
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is further extended to and including February 21, 2019.
2019-01-16
Motion to extend the time to file a response from January 22, 2019 to February 21, 2019, submitted to The Clerk.
2018-12-27
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is further extended to and including January 22, 2019. See Rule 30.1.
2018-12-17
Motion to extend the time to file a response from December 21, 2018 to January 21, 2019, submitted to The Clerk.
2018-11-30
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is extended to and including December 21, 2018.
2018-11-20
Motion to extend the time to file a response from November 21, 2018 to December 21, 2018, submitted to The Clerk.
2018-10-22
Response Requested. (Due November 21, 2018)
2018-10-17
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 11/2/2018.
2018-08-29
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due October 5, 2018)
2018-07-26
Application (18A97) granted by Justice Gorsuch extending the time to file until August 29, 2018.
2018-07-20
Application (18A97) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from July 30, 2018 to September 28, 2018, submitted to Justice Gorsuch.

Attorneys

Jennifer M. Gaulter
John R. Humphrey — Respondent
John R. Humphrey — Respondent
Missouri
D. John SauerOffice of the Attorney General, Petitioner
D. John SauerOffice of the Attorney General, Petitioner
Phillip Douglass
Clayton E. Gillette — Respondent
Clayton E. Gillette — Respondent
Phillip Douglass & Jennifer M. Gaulter
Clayton Evan GilletteGillette Law Office, LLC, Respondent
Clayton Evan GilletteGillette Law Office, LLC, Respondent