Whether this Court's decision in Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624 (2009), eliminated the federal equitable estoppel doctrine

QUESTION PRESENTED Before this Court decided Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624 (2009), federal courts had developed a federal version of the equitable estoppel doctrine that permits a non-signatory to enforce an arbitration agreement in certain circumstances. In its decision below, the Ninth Circuit held that Subway was not entitled to enforce Plaintiffs’ arbitration agreements under California’s equitable estoppel doctrine and failed to consider Subway’s argument that the federal equitable estoppel doctrine provides an alternative basis for enforcement. The court of appeals applied California law based on its precedent holding that Arthur Andersen eliminated the federal equitable estoppel doctrine. See Kramer v. Toyota Motor Corp., 705 F.3d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 2013). The court of appeals applied that precedent even though the Arthur Andersen Court never addressed the federal doctrine of equitable estoppel, let alone abrogated it. Meanwhile, other circuits continue to apply the federal equitable estoppel doctrine. The question presented is: Whether this Court’s decision in Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624 (2009), eliminated the federal equitable estoppel doctrine. ! This Court recently denied certiorari in Subway Restaurants, Inc. v. Warciak, No. 17-1956, which raised this same issue. Subway respectfully submits that certiorari is nevertheless warranted, particularly in light of the Fourth Circuit’s June 12, 2018 opinion in Weckesser v. Knight Enterprises, S.E., No. 17-1247, 2018 WL 2972665 (4th Cir. June 12, 2018), which demonstrates a clear circuit split on the continuing existence of the federal equitable estoppel doctrine. That case acknowledges Arthur Andersen but then proceeds to analyze a non-party’s right to arbitrate under ii the federal equitable estoppel doctrine. The Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Weckesser is irreconcilable with the Ninth Circuit’s decision to look exclusively to state law here. See Reasons for Granting the Petition, Section II, infra.