Whether a court may rely on the Tariff Act's perceived purpose to override its specific statutory requirements for selecting antidumping duty rates

QUESTION PRESENTED Under the Tariff Act, the U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) is required to select an antidumping duty margin that is remedial and not punitive. Commerce may go outside the administrative record and set a duty rate based on adverse “facts otherwise available” to fill a gap in the record that is caused by a party’s failure to provide information. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a)-(b). When employing that drastic measure, however, Commerce is required to “corroborate that information from independent sources that are reasonably at [its] disposal.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c). Here, Commerce employed “adverse facts available” against Petitioner but then expressly refused to consider relevant evidence demonstrating that the exorbitant duty rate it selected could not be corroborated. The decision below held that Commerce’s 75.36% duty rate was “extremely aberrant” and uncorroborated in light of the available evidence, but it nonetheless affirmed Commerce’s determination because, in its view, the statute’s “purpose” of deterring misconduct trumped the statutory provision requiring corroboration. That refusal to enforce the Tariff Act’s specific terms had the effect of upholding over $80 million in unsupported duties imposed on Petitioner. The question presented is: Whether a court may rely on the Tariff Act’s perceived purpose to override its specific statutory requirements for selecting antidumping duty rates.