Whether Arizona sheriffs are policymakers for counties in law enforcement, whether policymaker liability can be applied to Title VI and § 12601, whether non-mutual offensive issue preclusion violates due process

QUESTION PRESENTED In McMillian v. Monroe County, Alabama, 520 U.S. 781 (1997), this Court held that counties cannot be liable in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the actions of sheriffs acting in their law enforcement capacities, unless the sheriffs are found to have been acting as “policymakers” for the counties within the meaning of Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Here, the Ninth Circuit has misconstrued Arizona law to find sheriffs to be policymakers for Arizona’s counties in the area of law enforcement, took the unprecedented step of applying that concept to claims arising under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 34 U.S.C. § 12601, and the held Maricopa County (“the County”) bound by findings in a collateral case from which the County had been dismissed years before trial and entry of judgment in that case. The questions presented are: 1. Under Arizona law, as evaluated or mandated by McMillian, are Arizona’s__ sheriffs “final policymakers” for their respective counties with respect to matters of law enforcement? 2. Can “policymaker liability” properly be engrafted onto Title VI and § 12601? 3. Can courts, consistent with due process, apply nonmutual, offensive issue preclusion to bind a party to findings in a case when there is no evidence that another party remaining in that case had identical ii interests and “understood herself to be acting in a representative capacity [for the dismissed party] or the original court took care to protect the interests of the non-party.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 900 (2008).