Does the AEDPA apply where Petitioner's attorneys relied in good faith on the federal district court's local rules

question presented is: Does the AEDPA apply where Petitioner’s 2 attorneys relied in good faith on the federal district court’s local rules that Petitioner’s filings constituted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and where the federal district court’s docket entry identified his filings as a pending petition for a writ of habeas corpus, though he filed his formal petition after the effective date of the AEDPA? 2. In the guilt phase of this capital case, Rowland was convicted of raping and killing the victim. To prepare for the penalty phase, trial counsel hired psychologist, Dr. Hugh Ridlehuber. As found by the Ninth Circuit, however, trial counsel performed deficiently by hiring Dr. Ridlehuber much too late. Further, as found by the Ninth Circuit, trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to provide Dr. Ridlehuber Rowland’s birth records which showed him to have had “jaundice, blood transfusion, convulsions, and an infection” at birth. Because Dr. Ridlehuber did not have the birth records, he testified in the penalty phase that Rowland did not suffer from any organic brain damage or other mental disability except for borderline personality disorder. After two and one-half days of deliberation, the jury sentenced Rowland to death. In post-conviction proceedings in state court, Dr. Ridlehuber saw the birth records for the first time. After reviewing the records, he declared that had he seen the records, he would have testified in the penalty phase that there was a “very high probability” that Rowland suffered from organic brain damage at the time of his 3 birth and at the time of the crime as well as from bi-polar disorder. The state court summarily rejected the post-conviction petition. The federal district court denied the federal habeas petition on summary judgment, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The Ninth Circuit held that trial counsel performed deficiently in hiring Dr. Ridlehuber too late and in failing to provide him Rowland’s birth records, and that it was unreasonable for the California courts to have held otherwise. The Ninth Circuit went on to hold, however, that the California Supreme Court could have reasonably concluded that that Rowland was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s deficient performance. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that Dr. Ridlehuber’ s conclusions reached after seeing the birth records were “mere speculat[ion].” The Ninth Circuit also reasoned that the California Supreme Court, in its post-card denial, could have reasonably determined that the limited value of additional testimony from Dr. Ridlehuber about Rowland’s mental diagnoses would not have changed the outcome of the penalty phase when weighed against the aggravating evidence of Rowland’s of the rape and murder of the victim and his criminal record of multiple sexual assaults. The second question presented is: Did trial counsel’s deficient performance in the penalty phase prejudice Rowland, where Rowland would have been spared the death penalty if only one juror would have voted for life after 4 learning that there was a very high probability that Rowland suffered from organic brain damage and bipolar disorder at the time of his birth and at the time of the crime? 3. Inclosing argument in the penalty phase, the prosecutor expressed his personal opinion that were he on the jury, he would vote for death. The prosecutor also told the jurors that the voters of California so insisted upon the propriety of the death penalty that they had voted out of office three California Supreme Court justices who had failed to enforce it. The Ninth Circuit disapproved of both these remarks but held the California Supreme Court was not unreasonable in determining that that neither statement violated Rowland’s constitutional rights. The third question presented is: Did the prosecutor’s arguments, taken separately or together, violate Rowland’s right to due process of law or violate the principle of Caldwel