Whether § 924(c)'s residual clause, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B), is unconstitutionally vague after Johnson v. United States, 1385 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) and Sessions v. Dimaya, ___ U.S. __, 188 8. Ct. 1204 (2018)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED This petition presents another in the recurring series of questions about the validity of a so-called “residual clause,” categorizing which offenses constitute crimes of violence—this time in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Section 924(c)’s residual clause is identical to that of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), that was recently held to be unconstitutionally vague in Sessions v. Dimaya, __ U.S. __, 138 8. Ct. 1204 (2018). Despite the identical wording of the two clauses, the Circuits remain split as to whether the residual clause in § 924(c), too, has been dealt a fatal blow. This petition presents the following questions: I. Whether § 924(c)’s residual clause, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B), is unconstitutionally vague after Johnson v. United States, 1385 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (Samuel Johnson), and Sessions v. Dimaya, ___ U.S. __, 188 8. Ct. 1204 (2018). I. Whether carjacking (18 U.S.C. § 2119), which may be committed by intimidation alone, has as an element “the use . . . of physical force against the person or property of another,” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). Il. Whether the Eleventh Circuit’s rule that reasonable jurists could not debate an issue foreclosed by binding circuit precedent misapplies the standard articulated by this Court in Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003), and more recently in Buck v. Davis, 137 8. Ct. 759, 773-74 (2017), for determining whether a movant has made the threshold showing necessary to obtain a certificate of appealability (COA). i INTERESTED PARTIES There are no