Does a black defendant make a prima facie showing of discriminatory use of peremptory strikes under Batson's first step when he demonstrates that the prosecution has used peremptory strikes to remove the only two black prospective jurors from the venire?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In this case, involving a black defendant, the prosecutor struck both of the black prospective jurors. The defendant objected to the peremptory strikes, citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The district court, assuming it knew the race-neutral reason for one of the strikes, asked the prosecutor to provide her reason for striking the remaining black juror. The prosecutor proffered that the juror appeared to be of limited intelligence. Although the court did not share the prosecutor’s observations regarding the juror, it ultimately overruled the Batson objection on the grounds that the defendant had not established a prima facie showing of discrimination under Batson step one because he was required, and had failed, to demonstrate a pattern of discriminatory strikes. On the third day of trial, the district court sua sponte made additional findings regarding its Batson ruling. This time, the court noted that the juror had some difficulty in communicating, and that the prosecutor had stated an acceptable race-neutral justification for her final strike, without considering all of the circumstances bearing on the issue of discrimination to determine whether the proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination. The Court of Appeals affirmed based on those subsequent findings as to the prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral reason for the strike. The questions presented in this case are as follows: 1. Does a black defendant make a prima facie showing of discriminatory use of peremptory strikes under Batson’s first step when he demonstrates that the prosecution has used peremptory strikes to remove the only two black prospective jurors from the venire? 2. Where the district court does not reach Batson’s third step, and offers contradictory assessments of the prosecutor’s stated reason for a strike, should a reviewing court defer to the district court’s finding of record support for the stated reason for the strike or instead consider all record evidence to determine whether the peremptory strike was the product of race discrimination? i