Whether Mr. Eugene's incarceration constitutes a case involving substantial injury and satisfies the Article III case or controversy requirement

No question identified. : i : ; QUESTION(S). PRESENTED ‘1) Does Mr. Eugene's incarceration constitute a case involving substantial injury, whereby a controversy requiring Article III exercise of 3 discretion and intervening authority of this High Court exist. a. Does Mr. Eugene have standing to satisfy the case or controversy , requirement of federal constitution's Article III § 2 proscriptions. b. Does Mr. Eugene's challenge to his sentence satisfy the case ; or controversy requirements. By nature of its justiciability, actual injury, and constitutional redressability. 2) Does the U.S. Sentencing Commissions reluctance to denounce the retrospective application of the residual clause to Eugene's and others with Guideline Sentences violate the clause under the U.S. Constitution. 7 a. Can the U.S. Sentencing Commission legally promulgate what the U.S. Supreme Court has deemed illegal for Congress to legislate. : \ b. Does leaving in place, the retrospective guideline sentences under 4B1.2(a)(2), constitute the: "Tnconsistent with the statutes or constitution" boundaries undermining of the integrity of this _ judiciary" borderlines established for the U.S. Sentencing Comm ~ _-ission in Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 361, 335. c. Does the failure of the U.S. Sentencing Commission directly or via congressional directive constitute retrospective legislative _ enforcement of statutory content over and beyond the judiciary's power to nullify. As contemplated in Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 at _ 380 citing Humphries Executor U.S. 295 U.S. 602. . 10 vee : { d. Does the leaving in place of the retrospective residual . :.*¢lause based sentences by the U.S. Sentencing Commission as a delegated congressional rule maker defy the judiciary check a ; nullifying the residual clause in Johnson v. United States. . e. Does Mr. Eugene's separation of powers claim against the ' U.S. Sentencing Commission reach the constitutional infirmity a “which the guidelines are not immuned from, as established in . Beckles v. U.S. at . . 3) Is Mr. Eugene's guideline sentence based on the 4B1.2(a)(2) residual clause : a. Is Mr. Eugene's Florida battery pursuant Fla. Stat. §784. 04€1) a crime of violence under the guidelines elements : . clause. b. Can Mr. Eugene's Florida batter qualify as a crime of violence under the categorical or the modified categorical approach. 4) Does Mr. Eugene's reliance on this court's implicit ruling ; in Beckles support his claim that the retrospective effect of his . guideline sentence violate the separation of power clause satisfy the 28 U.S.C. § 2241 saving clause 3 requirements. 5) Does the 11th Circuit ruling in U.S. v.Vail-Bailon, 838 F.3d 1091 (11th Cir. Sep. 28, 2016) disqualifying Mr. Eugene's Fla. : batter under Fla. Stat. § 784.04 pursuant to this court's ruling in Johnson and its clarifying case Mathis support Mr. Eugene's actual innocence as a Career Offender claim pursuant 28 U.S.C. . . 2253. . ' 6) Does Mr. Eugene's assertions that, (1) His sentence violates ; 11 wos the separation of powers clause, (2) His Florida battery under . Fla. Stat. 784.01 does not qualify as a crime of violence pursuant ; the Supreme Court's ruling in Johnson and the 1ith circuit's ruling in Vail-Bailon; and (3) He was erroneously sentenced as a Career Offender pose questions debatable among reasonable jurist . as required to satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3) COA requirements. 120,