Is the voluntariness of consent to search a question of fact that is subject to the same deferential review as findings of historical fact?

QUESTION PRESENTED In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041 (1973), the Court stated that “whether a consent to a search was in fact ‘voluntary’. . . is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.” 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S. Ct. at 2047-48. Schneckloth did not concern the standard governing appellate review of voluntariness determinations, but many federal courts of appeals and state courts of last resort have taken the Court’s “question of fact” characterization to mean that voluntariness should be reviewed with the same deference as other findings of fact. Many other courts disagree, noting that the deference of clear-error review is inconsistent with the independent review the Court has prescribed for other factintensive determinations affecting constitutional rights, including the voluntariness of a suspect’s confession. And courts on both sides of the divide have handled the matter inconsistently. This split of authority is intractable and longstanding, with some courts explicitly stating that Schneckloth will bind them to their current approaches until the Court resolves the matter. Mr. Ratcliff petitions for a writ of certiorari to address this question: Is the voluntariness of consent to search a question of fact that is subject to the same deferential review as findings of historical fact?