Whether the definition of 'crime of violence' in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1. Is the definition of “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutionally vague, given the Court’s holding in Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018) that the identical definition in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague? 2. Can a completed Hobbs Act robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b) categorically be a “crime of violence” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(8)(A), if the offense is indivisible, and juries in three circuits are routinely instructed according to those circuits’ pattern instructions that the “property” taken may include “intangible rights” and the offense may be committed by simply causing the victim to “fear harm” which includes “fear of financial loss as well as fear of physical violence”? Does Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007) require a defendant to identify an actual prosecuted “case,” in addition to such a pattern instruction, to show a “realistic probability” that the statute covers non-violent conduct? 3. If a completed offense categorically has the use or threat of “violent force” “as an element,” is the attempted commission of that offense categorically a “crime of violence” simply because of the defendant’s “intent” to commit every element of the crime? Or must the “substantial step” required for an attempt offense itself be categorically violent to meet the elements clause? i INTERESTED PARTIES There are no