No. 18-5274

Manuel Vega v. United States

Lower Court: Ninth Circuit
Docketed: 2018-07-19
Status: Denied
Type: IFP
Response WaivedIFP
Tags: california-health-and-safety-code-11378 categorical-approach controlled-substance controlled-substance-offense criminal-conviction divisible-statute drug-offense federal-sentencing federal-sentencing-guideline mathis-v-united-states modified-categorical-approach sentencing-enhancement state-court-decision
Key Terms:
HabeasCorpus Immigration
Latest Conference: 2018-09-24
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Whether a court fulfills the mandate of Mathis v. United States if it looks only to whether a state defendant can be punished more than once for possessing different kinds of drugs under a state statute that prohibits multiple punishments for multiple crimes, as long as the defendant's acts all have a single 'objective'

Question Presented (OCR Extract)

QUESTION PRESENTED A prior drug conviction, if it is a federal “controlled substance offense,” can increase a federal criminal sentence or result in an alien’s deportation. Petitioner’s federal sentence was increased for a prior violation of California Health and Safety Code § 11378, which prohibits possession for sale of “a controlled substance,” i.e., one listed in California’s drug “schedules.” At issue here was whether the statute describes several “means” of committing one crime (an “indivisible” statute), or whether it describes “elements” of several different crimes (a “divisible” statute). With a divisible statute, the sentencing court can look behind the fact of the prior conviction to see if the prior offense actually matches a crime prohibited by the federal Controlled Substances Act. If it does, it is a “controlled substance offense,” and increases the sentence. In Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) this Court delineated how a court determines whether an alternatively phrased statute describes “elements” or “means.” Among other things, a court should consider: 1. Does the statute identify what things must be charged? Those things are “elements.” Something that need not be charged is a “means.” Id. at 2256. 2. What things must the prosecution prove, and the jury find, to sustain a conviction? Those are “elements.” Id. at 2248. 3. Do statutory alternatives carry different punishments? If so, “they must be elements.” If the alternatives listed are “illustrative examples,” they only describe the means to commit the crime. Id. at 2256. 4. Does a “state court decision” definitively answer the question? If so, “a sentencing judge need only follow what it says.” Ibid. Does a court fulfill the mandate of Mathis if it looks only to whether a state defendant can be punished more than once for possessing different kinds of drugs under a state statute that prohibits multiple punishments for multiple crimes, as long as the defendant's acts all have a single “objective”?

Docket Entries

2018-10-01
Petition DENIED.
2018-08-02
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 9/24/2018.
2018-07-26
Waiver of right of respondent United States to respond filed.
2018-07-16
Petition for a writ of certiorari and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed. (Response due August 20, 2018)

Attorneys

Manuel Vega
Walter K. Pyle — Petitioner
Walter K. Pyle — Petitioner
United States
Noel J. FranciscoSolicitor General, Respondent
Noel J. FranciscoSolicitor General, Respondent