Whether a rational jury could have found each essential element of the offense of transmitting a malicious code, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) and (c)(4)(B)(i), beyond a reasonable doubt

QUESTIONS PRESENTED I. Has the Fifth Circuit erred and its decision is in conflict with this Court's holding in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 LEd2d 560 (1979), by finding that a rational jury could have found each essential element of the offense of transmitting a malicious code, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(A)(5)(A) and (C)(4)(B)(D, beyond a reasonable doubt? Il. If the answer to the above question is in the affirmative, was trial counsel ineffective for failing to resubmit a motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all the evidence pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and its progeny? | Il. Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the district court's error applying an adjustment under USSG § 3C1.1 based on finding that Petitioner committed perjury in his testimony at trial, in contravention of his privilege to testify in his own behalf pursuant to United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 95, 113 S. Ct. 1, 122 L. Ed. 2d 445 (1993)? IV. Should the Fifth Circuit have reversed the district court's error in increasing Petitioner's base-offense level by applying $1,461,910 in lost revenue to the $235,890 actual loss amount and, as a result of the erroneous calculation, imposing an unreasonable sentence contrary to this Court's decision in Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 8.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007)? ii