Whether the proper test for imputing a manager's discriminatory conduct is the 'higher management' standard advanced by the Eleventh Circuit in Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 1999), or the 'managerial capacity' standard advanced by this Court in Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999)

QUESTION PRESENTED Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination against covered employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 1981la governs the award of damages—both compensatory and _ punitive—in actions brought pursuant to Title VII. Since the enactment of those Acts, a circuit split has developed regarding the circumstances under which a discriminating manager’s actions may be imputed to the company at large for purposes of awarding punitive damages. In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the trial court’s vacatur of punitive damages awarded under §1981a, holding that the discriminating manager’s actions could not be imputed to the company at large because the manager was not part of “higher management”. In contrast, had this matter arisen in nearly any other Circuit, it likely would have been decided differently under the “managerial capacity” standard articulated by this Court in Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n. 527 U.S. 526 (1999). Accordingly, this case presents the important issue of resolving the Circuits’ divergent standards for imputing to a company the discriminatory conduct of its managers. Therefore, the specific question presented is: Whether the proper test for imputing a manager’s discriminatory conduct is the “higher management” standard advanced by the Eleventh Circuit in Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 1999), or the “managerial capacity” standard advanced by this Court in Kolstad .