Whether a prior Kansas aggravated-battery conviction under KSA § 21-3414(a)(1)(C) qualifies as a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)'s element-of-violent-force clause

QUESTION PRESENTED The Tenth Circuit held that Shane McMahan’s prior Kansas aggravated-battery conviction, KSA § 21-3414(a)(1)(C), qualified as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s clause, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). But the relevant section of Kansas’s aggravated-battery statute has a causation element, not an element of violent force (“causing physical contact with another person”). A jury need only find that the defendant caused a particular result (here, physical contact with another person), not that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use violent force against another person to commit the crime. And so, in direct conflict with the Tenth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit has held that this section of the Kansas aggravated-battery statute does not have an element of violent force. Larin-Ulloa v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 456, 467 (5th Cir. 2006). This sharp circuit split implicates a larger conflict left unresolved by this Court in United States v. Castleman: “[w]hether or not the causation of bodily injury necessarily entails violent force” in the violent-felony context. 134 S.Ct. 1405, 1413 (2014). The question presented is: Whether a prior Kansas aggravated-battery conviction under KSA § 213414(a)(1)(C) qualifies as a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)’s clause. i