Can a state court require a petitioner to establish actual, subjective bias to obtain judicial recusal even though this Court has held that the constitutional standard for judicial recusal is objective?

QUESTION PRESENTED An Alabama jury voted to sentence Petitioner Calvin McMillan to life in prison for capital murder. Circuit Judge John Bush overrode the jury’s decision and imposed the death penalty. In his sentencing order, Judge Bush made an explicit finding that McMillan’s trial attorneys “provided effective assistance throughout these entire proceedings.” The judge issued that finding swa sponte, as McMillan could not raise a claim about his attorneys’ performance at that time. Both of the attorneys were significant financial contributors to Judge Bush’s most recent election campaign, and one of them was his most recent law clerk. Following his direct appeal, McMillan secured new counsel and filed a post-conviction petition alleging that his trial attorneys were ineffective. The case was assigned to Judge Bush. McMillan moved for recusal, arguing that Judge Bush’s prejudgment of the ineffectiveness issue and ties to the trial attorneys created an unconstitutional appearance of bias. Judge Bush denied the motion and summarily dismissed the post-conviction petition. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed those rulings, holding with respect to the recusal issue that Judge Bush was not “incapable of rendering a fair decision.” The question presented is this: Can a state court require a petitioner to establish actual, subjective bias to obtain judicial recusal even though this Court has held that the constitutional standard for judicial recusal is objective?! 1 See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 881 (2009) (“The inquiry is an objective one. The Court asks not whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his position is ‘likely’ to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.”’). i