Ralph Deon Taylor v. United States
CriminalProcedure
Does confronting a suspect with the mounting evidence against him constitute interrogation under Miranda?
QUESTION PRESENTED Rhode Island v. Innis defined interrogation, for the purposes of Miranda, to include “not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (emphasis added). Does confronting a suspect with the mounting evidence against him fall outside the definition of interrogation because it is unlikely to elicit an incriminating response, as the Ninth Circuit, as well as the First, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have held, or does such conduct serve no legitimate administrative purposes “attendant to arrest and custody” and irresistibly call for a response, and thus constitute interrogation, as the Second and Third Circuits, and a number of state courts, have held? i To Eee ee Le ae: