Whether the federal Unlawful Felon in Possession of a Firearm statute (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) exceeds Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause

QUESTION PRESENTED I. This Court and individual Justices have increasingly explained that Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause to criminalize conduct otherwise falling under the states’ traditional police power is subject to limits—and that those limits have teeth. Q: In light of Bond v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 2077 (2014). Natl Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,567 U.S. 519 (2012) (NFIB) and the dissent from denial of certiorari in Alderman v. United States,131 S. Ct. 700, 701 (Thomas and Scalia, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari), citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-559 (1995), does the federal Unlawful Felon in Possession of a Firearm statute (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), as construed (or misconstrued) by the circuit courts, exceed Congress's authority to regulate under the Commerce Clause? I. Does the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g),(which is that the statute requires only that the government prove that the defendant possessed a firearm that had been shipped in the unknown past by unknown individual’s unrelated to the defendant or his possession of the firearm), contradict the plain words of the statute which require that the defendant “ship or transport in interstate commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce?” Ill. Did the Fifth Circuit err in reading the statutory scheme which requires a knowing violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) for there to be an offense, as requiring only a knowing possession of a firearm, in contradiction to the plain language of the statute, the legislative history of the statute and this Court’s holdings in Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998), Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009), Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 618-19 (1994), McFadden v. United States, 135 8.Ct. 2298 (2015), United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 423 (1985); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 273 (1952), which hold that where the mens rea is “knowingly,” the government must prove the defendant had knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense? ii PARTIES Kenyan Buchanan is the Petitioner; he was the defendant-appellant below. The United States of America is the Respondent; it was the plaintiff-appellee below. iii