No. 18-5518

Norman Mearle Grim v. Florida

Lower Court: Florida
Docketed: 2018-08-08
Status: Denied
Type: IFP
Relisted (5)IFP
Tags: advisory-jury burden-of-proof caldwell-v-mississippi capital-case death-penalty death-penalty-sentencing eighth-amendment harmless-error hurst-v-florida hurst-violation sixth-amendment sullivan-v-louisiana
Key Terms:
DueProcess Punishment HabeasCorpus JusticiabilityDoctri
Latest Conference: 2018-11-09 (distributed 5 times)
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Whether a Hurst violation can be ruled harmless based solely on a pre-Hurst advisory jury's unanimous vote to recommend death, where the jurors heard no mitigating evidence

Question Presented (OCR Extract)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Can a violation of Hurst v. Florida, 136 8. Ct. 616 (2016), be ruled harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based solely on a pre-Hurst “advisory” jury’s unanimous vote to recommend the death penalty to the judge, in a case where the advisory jurors heard none of the available mitigating evidence? 2. Does the Florida Supreme Court’s per se harmless-error rule for Hurst claims violate the Eighth Amendment in light of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), by relying exclusively on the number of advisory jurors who voted to recommend the death penalty to the judge, where those jurors were repeatedly instructed that the judge alone, notwithstanding the recommendation of the majority of jurors, would make the findings of fact required for a death sentence under state law and bear ultimate responsibility for a death sentence? 3. Does the Florida Supreme Court’s per se harmless-error rule for Hurst claims, which relies entirely on pre-Hurst advisory jury recommendations that did not fulfill Sixth Amendment requirements as to any element of a Florida death sentence, contradict Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), and Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999)? 4. Where a defendant proffers uncontested evidence and requests a hearing on whether the State could meet its burden of establishing that a Hurst violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, does the Florida Supreme Court’s summary application of its per se harmless-error rule impermissibly shift the burden of proof and contravene this Court’s admonitions that harmless-error review cannot be “automatic or mechanical,” Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 958 (1983), must consider the whole record, see Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 583 (1986), and must be followed by “a detailed explanation based on the record,” Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 740 (1990)? i

Docket Entries

2018-11-13
Petition DENIED. Justice Thomas, concurring in the denial of certiorari: I concur for the reasons set out in Reynolds v. Florida, 586 U. S. ___ (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor, dissenting from the denial of certiorari: I dissent for the reasons set out in Reynolds v. Florida, 586 U. S. ___ (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
2018-11-05
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 11/9/2018.
2018-10-29
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 11/2/2018.
2018-10-22
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 10/26/2018.
2018-10-22
Rescheduled.
2018-10-09
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 10/12/2018.
2018-10-09
Rescheduled.
2018-10-03
Rescheduled.
2018-09-20
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 10/5/2018.
2018-09-17
Reply of petitioner Norman Grim filed.
2018-09-07
Brief of respondent State of Florida in opposition filed.
2018-08-06
Petition for a writ of certiorari and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed. (Response due September 7, 2018)

Attorneys

Norman Grim
Billy H. Nolas — Petitioner
Billy H. Nolas — Petitioner
State of Florida
Carolyn M. SnurkowskiOffice of the Attorney General, Respondent
Carolyn M. SnurkowskiOffice of the Attorney General, Respondent