DueProcess Punishment HabeasCorpus JusticiabilityDoctri
Whether a Hurst violation can be ruled harmless based solely on a pre-Hurst advisory jury's unanimous vote to recommend death, where the jurors heard no mitigating evidence
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Can a violation of Hurst v. Florida, 136 8. Ct. 616 (2016), be ruled harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based solely on a pre-Hurst “advisory” jury’s unanimous vote to recommend the death penalty to the judge, in a case where the advisory jurors heard none of the available mitigating evidence? 2. Does the Florida Supreme Court’s per se harmless-error rule for Hurst claims violate the Eighth Amendment in light of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), by relying exclusively on the number of advisory jurors who voted to recommend the death penalty to the judge, where those jurors were repeatedly instructed that the judge alone, notwithstanding the recommendation of the majority of jurors, would make the findings of fact required for a death sentence under state law and bear ultimate responsibility for a death sentence? 3. Does the Florida Supreme Court’s per se harmless-error rule for Hurst claims, which relies entirely on pre-Hurst advisory jury recommendations that did not fulfill Sixth Amendment requirements as to any element of a Florida death sentence, contradict Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), and Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999)? 4. Where a defendant proffers uncontested evidence and requests a hearing on whether the State could meet its burden of establishing that a Hurst violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, does the Florida Supreme Court’s summary application of its per se harmless-error rule impermissibly shift the burden of proof and contravene this Court’s admonitions that harmless-error review cannot be “automatic or mechanical,” Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 958 (1983), must consider the whole record, see Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 583 (1986), and must be followed by “a detailed explanation based on the record,” Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 740 (1990)? i