(1) Is the risk-of-force/residual clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutionally vague in the light of Sessions v. Dimaya, 332 U.S. 584, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 200 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2018) and Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 192 L. Ed. 2d 569 (2015)?

(2) Is Chi's guilty plea invalid because the life-without-parole sentence in the entirely with 924(c)(3)(B) is distinguishable from Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970)?

(3) Should a pro se (Criminal) defendant be allowed to file his/her pleadings electronically to ensure that they are filed properly without any delay if s/he shows sufficient evidence of police brutality in his/her criminal case?

(5) Is a criminal defense attorney automatically ineffective for which then forced pro se on his own to raise at least 4 meritorious, nonfrivolous claims issues in his appellate Brief on the Merits?

(6) Should a direct appeal be reversed correct address, even after the Appellant notified the appellee of his/her change of address?

(7) Should three judges (in a direct criminal appeal) have been recused because they were two separate lawsuits for judicial misconduct?

Whether the defendant's guilty plea was involuntary due to an unconstitutional no-parole sentence