Whether lower courts correctly evaluate the harmfulness of Bruton error without accounting for the devastating 'special prejudice' to the accused that inheres in the entire class of Bruton evidence

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Fifty years ago, this Court began the Bruton era by making two points perfectly clear. One, Bruton evidence is “devastating” to the accused. Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968). But, two, the admission of Bruton evidence does not necessarily require a new trial. Brown v. U.S., 411 U.S. 223, 231 (1973); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969). Since those foundational cases, this Court has elaborated the first point. As a result, we now understand (a) that the devastating character of Bruton evidence demands courts treat it as a class, and (b) when erroneously admitted, courts must treat instances of that class differently from other evidence to protect the rights of the accused. This Court has not revisited the second point, however, to explain how to evaluate Bruton harm given the unique character of the class; and it has never explained the full reach of Bruton’s protections. Lower courts have fractured over these questions. The questions presented are: 1. Whether lower courts correctly evaluate the harmfulness of Bruton error without accounting for the devastating “special prejudice” to the accused that inheres in the entire class of Bruton evidence. 2. Whether Bruton’s rationale—centered on the particularly devastating character of that class of evidence—reaches separate trials where the accomplice’s statement that facially incriminates the accused is introduced. ii