Whether the Third Amendment protects civilians from military intrusion into law enforcement

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Briefly, an Agent of Defense Criminal Investigation Service of the Inspector General's Office of the Department of Defense obtained the search and seizure warrant under the color of law enforcement, and solely conducted the investigation, grand jury indictment and bringing charges against the Petitioner, a civilian, in this campaign contribution violation case without the approval of FEC. Appellant was convicted and sentenced for imprisonment. Upon appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the conviction, ruling that military conduct civilian law enforcement without jurisdiction and in violations of Posse Comitatus Act and the federal statutes “are defects in instituting prosecution must be raised before trial," and “provide no remedy," and only repeated violations may be considered for a "special sanction of judicial deterrent." The rulings on PCA violations are inconsistent and contradicting among nearly every circuit of the court of appeals. 1. Does the Third Amendment of the Constitution afford people the protection from military intrusion into civilian affairs, such as investigation and bringing charges against civilians for a political contribution violation? 2. Does the provision of prohibiting the use of military as a posse comitatus in law enforcement proscribed in the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. §1385 and Domestic Security Act, 6 U.S.C. §466 deprive the military of jurisdiction in investigation and prosecution of civilians? 3. Does Congress enact the Statutes 18 U.S.C. §1385, 6 U.S.C. §466 as jurisdiction removal rules? ii % . 4. Is it constitutional to punish a defendant for a violation committed by a co-defendant, such as the amount of the campaign contribution made by another person? 5. Is the appellate court's standard ruling unlawful that violations of Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) and its statutes "provide no remedy" for the victim of the violation, and these laws may be violated repeatedly before the court to consider the "possibilities" for "the special sanction of a judicial deterrent"? iii