When a district court denies a state inmate's petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the inmate may appeal only if the district or circuit court grants him a certificate of appealability ("COA"). 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). The court of appeals may not skip ahead, decide the merits of the issue at bar to conclude that the issue was not debatable and, thus, deny COA. Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 773, 197 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2017).

In this case, Petitioner filed an application for COA, with the question being whether the district court erred in denying his motion to amend. Directly contrary to Buck and other case law of this Court, the Sixth Circuit failed to address whether the district court's ruling was debatable and, instead, short circuit any chance of appeal by affirming the district court's decision to deny relief (albeit on different grounds), treating the application as a request for leave to file a second habeas petition, and denying it. Thus, the first question presented to the Court is whether the Sixth Circuit failed to follow this Court's clear precedent as to the standard of review for whether a COA should be granted by failing to review whether the district court decision was debatable.

Concerns as to the finality of criminal cases have led to statutes such as the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act limiting the filing of second or successive federal habeas petitions. Rhines v. Weber, 533 U.S. 269, 276, 125 S. Ct. 1528 (2005). The circuit courts appear to agree that, when a motion to amend a petition for habeas corpus is filed before the district court's judgment, the motion is not to be treated as a second or successive habeas petition that requires pre-certification. See, e.g., Ching v. United States, 298 F.3d 174, 176-81 (2d Cir. 2002); Johnson v. United States, 196 F.3d 803, 803-06 (7th Cir. 1999).

In Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 125 S. Ct. 2641 (2005), the Court held that a Rule 60(b) motion that seeks to add a new ground for relief should be construed as a second or successive habeas action. Id. at 532. The Sixth Circuit appears to have concluded that Gonzalez necessarily applies to motions to amend. See Clark v. United States, 764 F.3d 653, 658 (6th Cir. 2014) ("When a habeas petitioner files a motion attacking the merits of a conviction or sentence after the adjudication of her habeas petition is complete—meaning that the petitioner has lost on the merits and has exhausted her appellate remedies—the motion, irrespective of its characterization, is really a second or successive habeas petition."). But Gonzalez did not review or address a motion to amend, does not purport to apply to a motion to amend, and the logic behind Gonzalez does not carry the same weight when taken to the context of motions to amend.

In this case, Petitioner sought to amend his § 2254 petition after an adverse judgment. The district court denied relief

Whether the Sixth Circuit erred in denying petitioner's habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction and sentence under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)