Whether a Mcquiggin v. Perkins actual innocence gateway can be denied

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ~~ (Rule: 14(a)) . Question #1: Whether a Mcquiggin v. Perkins 133 S.Ct 1924 (2013) actual innocence gateway past the AEDPA l-year limitation period default can be denied by a United States District Court, and affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals by saying that because the petitioner failed to present one of the three types of reliable new evidence listed.in Schlup vDelo 513 U-S. 298, 324 (1995) (i.e. exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eye witness accounts, ov critical physical evidence), then the petitioner failed to present a Mcquiggin v. Perkins actual innocence claim, despite the fact the petitioner did present reliable new evidence that was not one of the three examples listed in Schlup, but nonetheless, proved with Supreme Court case law that the petitioner suffered a miscarriage of justice through several constitutional violations, and is actually innocent of : the crime, because had the constitutional violations not occurred, no reasonable " juror would have voted to find him guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of all the elements of the charged statute as the plain language and legislative intent demand. Question #2: Whether a person who has been "placed on" (not sentenced to) deferred adjudication probation can be “in custody“’for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), and § 2254 in order to invoke jurisdiction in the federal courts to file for writ of habeas corpus § 2254, when the person has not been convicted, sentenced, or held in a jail or prison, and has not been able to seek direct neview or postconviction relief to meet the requirements of 2254(b)(1)(A}. If the federal courts do lack jurisdiction to hear a § 2254 Petition by such a person, is it constitutionally permissible to prevent the person from raising credible constitutional claims through a 2254 Petition by asserting a § 2244(d)(1) . time bar (by setting the l-year limitation period trigger date to 30 days after the deferred adjudication probation order, when the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to hear the claims in the first place) to the petitioner's first opportunity to file a § 2254 Petition after the petitioner is finally convicted, sentenced, sent to prison, and completed direct review, and state postconviction remedies. ~ . Question #3: Whether the phrase "judgment of a state court" or "final judgment" in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) and § 2254 can refer to an "order" that places a person on (not sentences them to) deferred adjudication probation, without the person .. having" been convicted, sentenced, or held in a jail or prison, and having no legal means to seek direct review pursuant to Tex. Rules of App. P. 25.2, and Tex. Code of Criminal P. Article 44.02, nor postconviction relief without having a conviction pursuant to state law to meet the requirements of § 2244(da)(1)(A) and (d)(2). . ‘ Question #4: Whether a defendant facing a revocation of deferred adjudication probation (before being convicted and sentenced to prison), has the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel to properly file a preconviction writ of habeas corpus that contains credible constitutional issues that calls into question his unlawful imprisonment. : : If so, was Morrison denied the actual effective assistance of counsel when. the trial court would not appoint counsel to help Morrison (an indigent defendant who ‘was being deprived of his liberty, and facing 20 years imprisonment) to help file nis credible preconviction writ of habeas corpus claims that called into question . ; : his unlawful imprisonment . Qustion #5: Whether a trial court can suspend a defendant's right to file a preconviction writ of habeas corpus (Article 1 § 9 Clause 2 U.S. Constitution) by saying the defendant cannot file pro se motions while having court appointed counsel, despite the fact, the court appointed counsel admitted to the court that he would not help the defendant properly file it, nor file it for him since any writs of hab