did-the-district-court-violate-the-sixth-amendment

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is brought to address Constitutional errors made by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, the Honorable Mary Stenson Scriven presiding during Michael Skillern's jury trial. Such errors departed from the accepted and usual course of trial proceedings, such that the errors of the District Court, sanctioned by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, affected the framework within which the trial proceeded. Errors of the nature brought to this Court's attention by this Petition for Writ of Certiorari . are errors, that resolve important federal questions in a manner that is in conflict with other United States Courts of Appeals and that ‘substantially conflict with the substantive decisions of this Court. ; The errors of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, that are sanctioned by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit compel the exercise of this Court's supervisory power, to resolve not only a circuit split but decisions ; of the Eleventh Circuit that establish rules not found or authorized by this Court's relevent substantive decisions. ; Further the District Court and the Eleventh Circuit abdicated their obligation to dismiss a prosecution brought for conduct, under ; statutes (18 USC § 1341, mail fraud and 18 USC § 1343, wire fraud) ; which do not have extraterritorial effect such that the District Court did not acquire subject matter jurisdiction, under the Government's indicted theory, of this case and the factual circumstances applicable to the business transactions made the basis of the prosecution. Li Fifty-six (56) years ago this Court held: "The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the assistance of counsel unless that right is intelligently and understandingly waived by. the accused..." (See Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 8L.Ed.2d. 70, 32 S. Ct. 884 (1560) Twenty-seven (27) years later in 1989 this Court, opined in Perry a defendant who testifies in his own behalf shall be entitled to the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of access to counsel and the right to effective assistance of counsel; because these rights are distinguishable, this Court made clear the denial by the government or the courts, of access to counsel beyond a short break in trial is a right not subject to prejudice analysis. Further twenty-six (26) years later the DC Circuit in an opinion predicated on Perry and Justice Scalia's concurrence in Mudd (1986), stated in its analysis of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confer with his attorney during a trial recess, that: ; “after.*Cronic, the Court confirmed that a trial court's denial of the defendant's right to confer with his attorney during trial recess "is not subject to the kind of prejudice analysis that is appropriate in determining whether the quality of a lawyer's performance itself has been constitutionally ineffective" Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 280, 109 S. Ct. 594, 102 L.Ed.2d 624 (1989). As this Court explained in (417 U.S. App. D.C. 374) Mudd (795 F.3d 111) 798 F.2d at 1515 a rule that requires a defendant to establish that he was prejudiced by his inability to consult with counsel would require a defendant to show "what he and counsel discussed, what they were prevented from discussing, and how the order altered the the preparation of defense" and (plresumably the government would then be free to question the defendant and counsel about the discussion that did take place. We stated then that we could not accept a rule whereby private discussions between counsel and client could be exposed... The Eleventh Circuit's "Actual-Deprived Rule" among other consequen: ces would require exposure of counsel and a defendant's privileged communications. See United States v. Bell, 795 F.3d 88 (DC Cir. 2015). Lii . QUESTION I DID THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER PROHIBITING DEFENDANT SKILLERN, FROM CONFERRING WITH