When a fundamental structural error results in an invalid judgment against a civil litigant in violation of the Due Process Clause, is the error per se prejudicial, as held by seven state courts of last resort and two circuits, or must the litigant prove prejudice, as held by five state high courts and two circuits?

QUESTION PRESENTED As this Court has cautioned, “harmlesserror rules can work very unfair and mischievous results,” including when “legally forbidden” tactics substantially impact a proceeding. Chapman ov. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967). In criminal cases, the Court has identified categories of structural error which are not susceptible to a harmless-error inquiry, see, e.g., Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281-282 (1993); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974); Estes v. State of Tex., 381 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1965), while as to other errors the Court has placed the burden to prove harmlessness on the beneficiary of the error. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. Not unlike in criminal cases, specific injury resulting from certain fundamental errors in civil proceedings may be difficult to identify or may not yet have occurred. This is the case where, as here, summary adjudication is awarded in plaintiffs favor on a cause of action for declaratory relief which is, as acknowledged below, legally forbidden. The Court’s silence on structural error in the civil context has caused a deep split among state and federal courts. The question presented is: When a fundamental structural error results in an invalid judgment against a civil litigant in violation of the Due Process Clause, is the error per se prejudicial, as held by seven state courts of last resort and two circuits, or must the litigant prove prejudice, as held by five state high courts and two circuits?