Does a 'person' exist, an 'unborn-child' exist under the 14° Amendment which deserves protection from injury and/or have a legal right in a court of law under Fed R. Civ P. Rule 17), Ubi Jus Ibi Remedium?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Under Roe and Casey’s “Age of Viability” holding that limits a timeframe for a mother’s right to chose: if after expiration of that holding; whether by Legislative law or SCOTUS rule; The question is: —Does a “person” exist, an “unborn-child” exist under the 14° Amendment which deserves protection from injury and/or have a legal right in a court of law under Fed R. Civ P. Rule 17), Ubi Jus Ibi Remedium? 2. If Georgia has enacted two laws: (A) defining criminal conduct of “Feticide; voluntary manslaughter of an unborn child’(O.C.G.A § 16-5-80) and (B) defining “When abortion is legal; filing of certificate of abortion by performing physician’ (O.C.GA. § 16-12-141) holding (i) “Age of Viability” and Gi) “Fetal Pain” as compelling reasons for enacting the latter legislation. The question is: —Does this correlative language between statutes, working in concert, create a liberty interest under the US Constitution thereby allowing an unwed biological father a protected 1°, 9, 14 Amendment Right to be a decision maker and to act in the best interest of his unborn child? 3. In Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 582 US (2017) this court held “ltlhe gender line Congress drew is incompatible with the Fitth Amendment's requirement that the Government accord to all persons ‘the equal protection of the laws“ The question is: —Does Georgia’s 0.C.G.A §19-7-22 (Legitimation statute) survive under a similar Constitutional theory of Gender Inequality for unwed biological fathers, when this Court’s 1% and 14° Amendment jurisprudence has long held biological interest is inclusive, only severed for just cause and only through rigorous Due Process? 4. Does Title 19, Ch.7, Art.2 of Georgia Code survive constitutional scrutiny under Troxel; when an unwed biological father has no legal parental rights upon paternity confirmation and maternal grandparents have a greater legal interest? 5. Does Title 19, Ch.7, Art.2 of Georgia Code survive Constitutional scrutiny under Bills of “Pains and Penalties” analysts when the unwed biological father must endure a greater challenge to exercise parental rights, be a decision maker under Troxel? @ 6. Under totality: () Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US 356,370 (1886), Gi) Haines v, Kerner, 404 US 519 (1972), (iii) Owen v. City of Independence, 445 US 622 (1980), (iv) Leatherman, (v)PLRA, (vi) Rotella v Woods, 528 U.S. 549 (2000), (vii) concerted Twombly/[gbal standard, (viii) Jones v. Bock, 549 US 199 (2007)...etc, the question is this: —Do amorphous & arbitrary inferior Article [IJ environments present insurmountable obstacles towards meritorious in pro-per/pro-se/sui juris Access To Courts causing abridgment of Political Speech, Petitioning rights or unalienable pursuit of civic duty-thereby causing cascading irreparable injury of a Constitutional magnitude when seen through this Courts holdings in Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002) ? 7. If “We the People” delegated power to Congress for governing; namely, to apply uniformly under the Enclave Clause (US Const Art I, § 8, {| 17) and/or to “stretch” as “necessary & proper” under the Elastic Clause (US Const Art I, § 8, §18) across all Districts, Circuits of Article III power, the questions are: ~—-Does 28 U.S. Code § 2072 survive scrutiny under Non-Delegation and/or Separation of Powers in either of two actions: 1*: Art. I to SCOTUS, 2™: from SCOTUS to inferior court for local rule-making where there exists impermissibly vague discretion, in contrast to this Court criminal rulemaking viewpoint in Mistretta v. US, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) and more in line with Justice Harlan in Field v. Clark,143 U. S. 649(1892) —Does 28 U.S. Code § 2072 fail or waterdown Congress’s checking powers of legislation and deprive Equal Protection, Equal Application of the laws, creating arbitrary environments...ie Do “We the People” have a Constitutional interest to demand/enforce consistency of Article III powers, a “branding” of Federal Rules set forth from Congress or th