Can the presentation of false evidence, in support of a false theory, constitute a reasonable trial strategy under Strickland v. Washington?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED A. Can the presentation of false evidence, in support of a false theory, that trial counsel knew or should have known was false, ever constitute a reasonable trial strategy, to rebut a claim of deficient performance, under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)? B. Should the Sixth Circuit be permitted to unilaterally abrogate the presumption of prejudice that arises in a criminal case from “any private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury,” required by Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954), and reaffirmed in Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1893 (2016)? i